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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JUDITH H. D1ENES and
DIANNE D. McMAIN,
Plaintiffs and A ppeUants,
-vs.SAFECO LIFE INSURANCE
COMP ANY, a Washington
corporation,
Defendarnt and Respondent.

Case
No.11048

Appellants' Brief in Answer to
Respondent's Petition
for Rehearing
POINT I
RESPONDENT HAS RAISED NO NEW OR
IMPORTANT MATTERS NOT PREVIOUSLY CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT.
The gist of respondent's Petition for a Rehearing is
that the facts of ihe case would justify a verdict of no
cause of action by the jury. But that was not and is
not the issue before this Court on appeal. Appellants
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contended that they were prevented from presenting
their theory of the case to the jury by the rulings of the
trial court. This court agreed that ''The trial court
advised plaintiffs' counsel that he would not permit him
to argue that the insuring agreement ~was ambiguous."
Nevertheless com1~0l for respondent did argue to the
jury "that plaintiffs could not recover unless they had
proved that the death of DiEJncs resulte<l solely from
injuries effected through external, \'iolent and accidental
means." (See affidavit of respondent's counsel set out in
full at pages 10-11 of Appellants' Brief.)
Compare this \vith the fact that the trial court did
not permit appellants' counsel to argue to the jury his
theory of the case as recited in plaintiffs' requested instruction number 19. (See paragraph 4 of affidavit of
plaintiffs' counsel set forth i11 full at pages 9-10 of Appellants' Brief.) Requested irn.;trnrtion number 19 explained plaintiffs' theory of the law of this case as
follows:
"The death need not ha n• resulted solely from
the injuries incurred by external, violent and accidental means, hut must hav0 occurred as a result
of these injuries in order for plaintiffs to recover.''
The point of difference between counsel was sharp
and divergent. This court has already ruled that error
was committed by the trial court on this crucial issue.
Nothing nmv has been cited or argued by respondent to
justify this court's granting of a rehearing. 'l1he clear
fact remains m1challe11ged that plaintiffs were denied
their right to have their theory of the case presented
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to the jury by the trial court's rulings. No new or important issue not previously before this court having
been raised by respondent, the petition for a rehearing
:ohould be denied.
Plaintiffs are entitled to present to the jury for their
<lctermination the issue of whether the insured died from
a hra rt attack resulting from the injuries sustained in the
auto accident. Until this occurs plaintiffs have not had
their day in court. If Mr. DiEnes died as a result of a
heart attack induced by injuries, plaintiffs am entitled
to recover under the policy language selected by respondent and hy the opinion of this court in this case.

POINT II
'rHERE IS NO PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY OF A JURY VERDICT WHEN THE
PIVOTAL ISSUE IS NEVER REALLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY.
Under the rulings of the trial court and over the
objection of plaintiffs the case was tried and argued
on the premise that plaintiffs were not entitled to recover if there were contributing cause·s to Mr. DiEnes'
dca th. As restricted by the trial court's rulings, plaintiffs never had a chance to argue to the jury the pivotal
issue in this case, i.e., "whether the insured died from
a heart attack resulting from those injuries." So long
as this issue was never submitted for the consideration of
the jury, it would be error to affirm the jury verdict
because of a presumption of the validity of the verdict.
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There is no basis for such a presumption in the face of
the record.
The Petition for Rehearing should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
MULLINER, PRINCE & MANGUM
MAX K. MANGUM
206 El Paso Natural Gas Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
.Attorneys for Plaintiffs.Appellants
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